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In a polarizing political climate, citizens frequently 
experience a clash of values when debating pressing 
societal issues. A central question in political psychol-
ogy has been how the general ideologies that represent 
these values drive human cognition, emotion, and 
behavior. Notably, the rigidity-of-the-right model stipu-
lates that the political left and right differ in their cogni-
tive styles, as reflected in increased closed-mindedness 
among individuals on the right ( Jost, 2017). In recent 
years, however, researchers have increasingly recog-
nized that not only political orientation but also politi-
cal extremism meaningfully predict people’s responses 
to societal and political events. We define political 
extremism as the extent to which regular citizens are 
polarized into, and strongly identify with, generic left- 
or right-wing ideological outlooks on society. In this 
article, we examine psychological features of extreme 
political ideologies. In what ways are political left- and 
right-wing extremists actually quite similar to one 
another and different from moderates?
The basic idea that left- and right-wing extremists share 
a range of psychological similarities is consistent with 
theories of extremism and radicalization (e.g., Kruglanski 
et al., 2014; see also Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; Hoffer, 
1951). The goal of this article is to examine the psychol-
ogy of extreme political ideologies by integrating these 
prior theoretical insights with recent findings. We spe-
cifically propose four interrelated psychological fea-
tures that characterize political extremism. Moreover, 
although we do not dispute that political orientation 
predicts important psychological variables (e.g., accep-
tance of inequality), we illuminate how some psycho-
logical features that were historically attributed to the 
political right might more accurately be attributed to 
both political extremes.
Political Extremism: Four Psychological 
Features
Although we do not claim that the propositions reviewed 
here represent the only psychological features 
of political extremism, they are well supported by 
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Abstract
In this article, we examine psychological features of extreme political ideologies. In what ways are political left- and 
right-wing extremists similar to one another and different from moderates? We propose and review four interrelated 
propositions that explain adherence to extreme political ideologies from a psychological perspective. We argue that (a) 
psychological distress stimulates adopting an extreme ideological outlook; (b) extreme ideologies are characterized by 
a relatively simplistic, black-and-white perception of the social world; (c) because of such mental simplicity, political 
extremists are overconfident in their judgments; and (d) political extremists are less tolerant of different groups and 
opinions than political moderates. In closing, we discuss how these psychological features of political extremists 
increase the likelihood of conflict among groups in society.
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empirical evidence, have been frequently studied by 
psychologists, and jointly contribute to a parsimonious 
understanding of this phenomenon. We specifically 
examine the relationships between political extremism 
and (a) psychological distress, (b) cognitive simplicity, 
(c) overconfidence, and (d) intolerance.
Psychological distress
The basis of our argument is that psychological 
distress—defined as a sense of meaninglessness that 
stems from anxious uncertainty—stimulates adherence 
to extreme ideologies. This argument is consistent with 
significance-quest theory, which proposes that an 
important reason why people become radicalized is a 
quest for significance—the need to feel important and 
respected by supporting a meaningful cause (Kruglanski 
et  al., 2014). Distressing personal or societal events 
(e.g., injustices, economic crises, wars) undermine the 
extent to which perceivers experience the world as 
meaningful and therefore stimulate people to regain a 
sense of purpose through strong and clear-cut ideologi-
cal convictions. Although significance-quest theory was 
originally designed to explain terrorism, these pro-
cesses also contribute to political extremism among 
regular citizens (Webber et al., 2018).
Empirical findings support a relationship between 
psychological distress and extreme political ideologies. 
Compared with moderates, political extremists—on 
both the left and right of the spectrum—report stronger 
anxiety about their economic future (van Prooijen, 
Krouwel, Boiten, & Eendebak, 2015). Furthermore, 
extremists are more suspicious than moderates about 
governmental institutions, suggesting distressed expec-
tations of these institutions (Inglehart, 1987). Experi-
mental findings are consistent with these insights. For 
instance, people psychologically compensate for feel-
ings of uncertainty and fear through strong ideological 
convictions (McGregor, Prentice, & Nash, 2013), and 
inducing a loss of significance increases extreme beliefs 
on both the left and right (Webber et al., 2018).
The link between psychological distress and political 
extremism is inconsistent with the assumption of the 
rigidity-of-the-right model that psychological distress 
stimulates conservative ideologies only. We note, how-
ever, that psychological distress stimulates a preference 
for leaders who, in addition to being radical, are also 
group-oriented (Hogg, Meehan, & Farquharson, 2010). 
Feelings of distress therefore make political currents 
that are not only extreme but also nationalistic particu-
larly appealing. Indeed, the majority of studies indicat-
ing a right-wing shift under conditions of uncertainty 
were conducted in Western countries where the politi-
cal currents that combine radicalism with nationalism 
happen to be right wing (e.g., the United States, several 
European Union, or EU, member states; Jost, 2017). 
Would distress exert similar effects in countries where 
the political currents that combine radicalism with 
nationalism are mostly located on the left, such as 
Venezuela (i.e., Hugo Chavez and Nicolás Maduro), 
Ecuador (i.e., Evo Morales), or Nicaragua (i.e., Daniel 
Ortega; e.g., Müller, 2016)? In fact, only recently in 
Mexico—a country suffering from high murder rates, 
drug cartels, corruption, and economic distress—the 
left-wing populist and nationalist leader Andrés Manuel 
López Obrador won the presidential elections by a 
landslide.
Evidence indeed suggests that the link between dis-
tress and conservatism is much less straightforward 
than often assumed (Malka, Lelkes, & Holzer, 2017). 
For instance, a cross-national study suggests that secu-
rity needs predict right-wing attitudes in countries with 
high levels of human development but left-wing atti-
tudes in countries with low levels of human develop-
ment; moreover, security needs predict culturally 
right-wing but economically left-wing attitudes (Malka, 
Soto, Inzlicht, & Lelkes, 2014). Furthermore, reminding 
people of their mortality can increase both extremism 
and conservatism (Burke, Kosloff, & Landau, 2013), but 
the conservative shifts observed in this research domain 
can alternatively be explained by increased nationalism 
following death reminders (Crawford, 2017). Finally, 
macropolitical analyses reveal that the main societal 
conditions preceding the rise of extremist regimes in 
the 20th century were characterized by ephemeral 
gains: a short-lived period of prosperity (e.g., territorial 
expansion, economic wealth) followed by critical 
losses. These distressing societal circumstances facili-
tated the momentum of not only fascist (extreme-right) 
but also communist (extreme-left) regimes (Midlarsky, 
2011).
Psychological distress thus increases extremist beliefs 
and support for radical movements. The processes 
described here steer the electorate away from moderate 
ideologies and either polarize societies in both direc-
tions or yield left- or right-wing electoral shifts. The 
specific direction of these centrifugal effects is likely to 
depend on a complex mix of cultural, political, and 
historical factors that shape whether the ideological 
currents that combine radicalism with nationalism in a 
given community are located mostly on the political 
right, mostly on the political left, or on both ends of 
the political spectrum.
Cognitive simplicity
Second, we propose that extreme ideologies are char-
acterized by a relatively simplistic, black-and-white 
perception of the social world. Feelings of distress 
prompt a desire for clarity, and extremist belief systems 
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provide meaning to a complex social environment 
through a set of straightforward assumptions that make 
the world more comprehensible (Kruglanski, Pierro, 
Mannetti, & De Grada, 2006). These theoretical insights 
would therefore predict a link between political extrem-
ism and cognitive simplicity.
Empirical findings support this view. One classic 
study analyzed the content of speeches about slavery 
by politicians shortly before the U.S. Civil War and 
found decreased integrative complexity among rela-
tively extreme politicians compared with political mod-
erates (Tetlock, Armor, & Peterson, 1994). In a recent 
series of studies, participants consistently rated how 
similar or dissimilar they considered a range of social 
stimuli, including politicians, social groups, and news-
papers. Compared with moderates, political extremists 
formed more sharply distinguished, homogenous clus-
ters of similar versus dissimilar stimuli, suggesting that 
they perceive the social world in simpler and more 
clearly defined mental categories (Lammers, Koch, 
Conway, & Brandt, 2017).
Finally, evidence suggests that political extremists 
view societal and political events more simply. Although 
the political left and right endorsed diametrically dif-
ferent solutions to the EU refugee crisis (with the left 
being more inclusive and the right more exclusive 
toward refugees), both extremes believed that the solu-
tion to this crisis was simple—distinguishing them from 
moderates, who believed that more complex solutions 
were needed (van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Emmer, 2018). 
Such cognitive simplicity is also reflected in political 
extremists’ tendency to believe conspiracy theories. 
Although the left and right are equally likely to endorse 
conspiracy theories (Uscinski & Parent, 2014), the polit-
ical extremes believe conspiracy theories more strongly 
than moderates (van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Pollet, 2015; 
see also Imhoff, 2015; Krouwel, Kutiyski, van Prooijen, 
Martinsson, & Markstedt, 2017). Political extremism is 
associated with a relatively simplistic outlook on the 
social and political world.
Overconfidence
The third psychological feature is that political extrem-
ists are overconfident in their judgments. This proposi-
tion is closely tied with the insight that political 
extremism predicts cognitive simplicity. While simplistic 
causal models of reality enable extremism by address-
ing the epistemic need to make the world more predict-
able (Kruglanski et al., 2006), they also enhance beliefs 
that one accurately understands reality. Put differently, 
people are more confident about judgment domains 
that seem simple.
Such overconfidence is reflected in findings that both 
left- and right-wing extremists consider their political 
beliefs to be superior on a range of topics, including 
health care, immigration, and affirmative action, com-
pared with moderates (Toner, Leary, Asher, & Jongman-
Sereno, 2013). Belief superiority is a poor predictor of 
actual knowledge, however, and predicts a tendency to 
select agreeable but ignore disagreeable information 
(Hall & Raimi, 2018). Furthermore, political extremists 
display increased confidence in numeric estimation 
tasks (Brandt, Evans, & Crawford, 2015), suggesting 
overconfidence also in nonpolitical judgment domains.
Finally, one study assessed Dutch participants’ 
domain-specific knowledge and judgmental certainty 
about the EU refugee crisis. Results revealed that left- 
and right-wing extremists did not differ from moderates 
in their domain-specific knowledge of this geopolitical 
event, yet they did experience increased judgmental 
certainty. Consistent with our theorizing, findings 
showed that the relationship between political extrem-
ism and judgmental certainty was statistically accounted 
for by the belief that the solution for the refugee crisis 
is simple (van Prooijen et  al., 2018). The findings 
reviewed here suggest that political extremists—on 
both ends of the spectrum—are overconfident in their 
beliefs.
Intolerance
The final psychological feature is that political extrem-
ists are less tolerant of different groups and opinions 
than moderates. Through the combined processes of 
cognitive simplicity and overconfidence, extremists may 
experience their moral judgments as moral absolutes 
that reflect a simple and universal truth. Such moral 
superiority implies that different values and beliefs—
and the groups of people who endorse them—are con-
sidered morally inferior. This line of reasoning is 
consistent with findings that strong moral convictions 
predict intolerance (Skitka, 2010).
Previous theorizing has often interpreted intolerance 
as a predominantly right-wing phenomenon. For 
instance, people on the right are more prejudiced of 
ethnic minorities than people on the left (e.g., Sears & 
Henry, 2003). Prejudice can apply to a broader range 
of social categories than minorities, however. Accumu-
lating findings underscore that people on the political 
left and right are both prejudiced toward groups ste-
reotypically associated with different ideologies. Exam-
ples of social categories subject to left-wing prejudice 
include Christians, businesspeople, and the military; 
examples of social categories subject to right-wing 
prejudice include ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians, 
and feminists. For both the left and right, such prejudice 
is attributable to an ideological conflict that is based 
on the assumption that people with a different social 
identity also have different ideological beliefs (for an 
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overview, see Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & 
Wetherell, 2014).
But whereas political orientation is a poorer predic-
tor of intolerance than previously assumed, political 
extremism reliably predicts intolerance. In a large Dutch 
sample, participants on both extremes derogated out-
groups more strongly than did politically moderate 
participants (van Prooijen et  al., 2015). Furthermore, 
compared with moderates, both left- and right-wing 
extremists display stronger dogmatic intolerance, 
defined as the tendency to reject opposing beliefs, and 
consider any ideological belief that differs from their 
own to be inferior (van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2017). 
Political extremists are thus less tolerant than moderates 
about different ideological belief systems or the groups 
of people that endorse them.
Discussion
The four psychological features discussed here suggest 
that political extremism is fueled by feelings of distress 
and is reflected in cognitive simplicity, overconfidence, 
and intolerance. These insights are important to under-
standing how political polarization increases political 
instability and the likelihood of conflict between groups 
in society. Excessive confidence in the moral superiority 
of one’s own ideological beliefs impedes meaningful 
interaction and cooperation with different ideological 
groups and structures political decision making as a 
zero-sum game with winners and losers. Strong moral 
convictions consistently decrease people’s ability to 
compromise and even increase a willingness to use 
violence to reach ideological goals (Skitka, 2010). These 
processes are exacerbated by people’s tendency to 
selectively expose themselves to people and ideas that 
validate their own convictions. For instance, both infor-
mation and misinformation selectively spread in online 
echo chambers of like-minded people (Del Vicario 
et al., 2016).
This article extends current insights in at least three 
ways. First, the features proposed here help to explain 
why throughout the past century not only extreme-right 
but also extreme-left movements (e.g., socialism, com-
munism) have thrived in times of crisis (Midlarsky, 
2011). Second, understanding the mind-set of extremists 
in all corners of the political spectrum is important in 
times of polarization and populist rhetoric. The current 
propositions provide insights into why traditionally 
moderate parties in the EU have suffered substantial 
electoral losses. In particular, the support for well-
established parties on the moderate left (e.g., social 
democrats) and moderate right (e.g., Christian demo-
crats) has dropped in recent years, whereas the support 
for left- and right-wing populist parties has increased 
(Krouwel, 2012). Third, the present arguments are 
based on evidence from multiple countries with differ-
ent political systems (van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2017), 
which suggests that they apply to both two-party sys-
tems (e.g., the United States) and multiparty systems 
(e.g., many European countries).
Of importance, the features presented here can have 
both negative and positive societal implications. Many 
movements that were once considered radical have 
been responsible for important social change (e.g., 
human-rights movements). For instance, in the study 
by Tetlock and colleagues (1994), not only extreme 
slavery advocates but also extreme abolitionists showed 
decreased integrative complexity compared with peo-
ple considered moderate at the time; however, few 
people nowadays would dispute that the abolitionists 
were morally right (it indeed requires little cognitive 
complexity to conclude that slavery is wrong). People 
can endorse both harmful oversimplifications and sim-
ple moral truths with high confidence; moreover, intol-
erance of hate-driven ideological movements (e.g., 
White supremacism) can be compatible with moral 
progress.
To conclude, although there are important psycho-
logical differences between people with left-wing and 
people with right-wing ideologies, there are also sub-
stantial similarities between left- and right-wing extrem-
ists that differentiate them from political moderates. The 
features presented here provide a psychological per-
spective on political extremism and contribute to a 
more complete understanding of how political ideology 
predicts human cognition, emotion, and behavior.
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